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ABSTRACT
Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two-firm merger and empirical techniques
are now widely used to assess the impact of cost-reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post-
merger market.  We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market then the
merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre-merger empirical
estimates.  Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two-firm merges will lead to higher prices
regardless of the merger’s cost-savings. We show that our results may obtain even when we allow for
post-merger entry.
Keywords: mergers, cost synergies, vertical product differentiation
JEL Classifications: L10, L412
Product Differentiation, Cost-Reducing Mergers, and Consumer Welfare
By George Norman, Lynne Pepall and Dan Richards, and Dan Richards
1.  Introduction
This paper is concerned with the effects of horizontal mergers on prices and consumer welfare.
The last sixteen years has witnessed an impressive growth in the use of empirical techniques to
evaluate such effects.  The typical approach has been to build a model of the post-merger market by
using estimates of the pre-merger demand elasticities and cost parameters.  Simulations of the
empirical model then yield best guesses of the likely post-merger outcomes.
1  Such techniques can
be extremely useful for evaluating the impact of any cost efficiencies that the merger is alleged to
generate.  This is important, particularly in light of the increased emphasis on cost efficiencies in
the 1997 horizontal merger guidelines jointly published by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).  The importance of evaluating the impact of cost
efficiencies takes on even greater significance given the substantial weight placed on such savings
by Timothy Muris, current Chairman of the FTC, who has publicly argued that mergers that both
raise price and reduce costs are rare, even when entry is difficult.
2
Yet while we think that empirical modeling and simulation will continue to play a vital and
necessary role in merger analysis, we also believe that theory plays an equally important role.
This is particularly true for cases in which a merger of two firms could result in a change in the
mix of products offered in the post-merger market.  In this case the relevance of the pre-merger
estimates of own- and cross-price demand elasticities becomes a questionable guide to assessing
the post-merger market outcome.    Eliminating product lines may be an unlikely scenario in
                                                          
1 See, for example, Baker and Bresnahan (1985), Werden and Froeb (1994), Shapiro (1996). Hausman and Leonard
(1997), and Nevo (2000).3
markets whose products are best thought of as horizontally differentiated. In horizontally
differentiated product markets consumers do not agree on what is the most preferred good and so
each consumer has her own preferred product specification.  Firms that merge in this setting have
an incentive to maintain their pre-merger product lines as a means to reach as many consumers
as possible.  However, firm incentives are quite different when products are vertically rather
horizontally differentiated. In vertically differentiated product markets, consumers do agree on
the ranking of the different brands of products, but they have different willingness to pay for the
goods. Thus the incentive to maintain the pre-merger product offering is different in the post
merger market.
In this paper we use a vertically differentiated product market to explore the issue of post-
merger product selection in the welfare analysis of a horizontal mergers.  Our analysis demonstrates
that a little bit of theory can sometimes go a long way in illuminating the likely impact of a merger
on consumer welfare. Specifically, we show that in the absence of any new entry a merger in a
vertically differentiated market can lead to a reduction in the number of products available in the
market and a rise in consumer prices no matter how large are the associated cost efficiencies.
Even when we allow for the possibility of entry into the post merger market our results continue to
hold for a range of cost efficiencies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Our basic model is presented in section
2.  In sections 3 and 4 we analyze the impact of a two-firm merger on prices and profits under
two scenarios with respect to the pre-merger costs of the merging firms.  Section 5 summarizes
our main conclusions.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 See Muris, Statement before Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition,
(November, 1995).  See also Muris (1999).4
2.  The Model
We adopt the vertically differentiated model first developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for
a product market in which there are initially 3 products.
3  Consumers are assumed to value some
characteristic of each product i, measured by the variable zi, where  ] z , z [ zi ∈  with z > 0, i=1,2,3.
Consumers know the characteristic content zi of each of the products and they have identical
rankings of the products.  In particular, consumers all agree that more of the characteristic z is
better.  However, consumer willingness to pay for this characteristic differs across the population
of consumers. The characteristic zi is like an index of quality agreed to by all consumers.  More
specifically, zi could be interpreted as the strength of the brand image of good i, as in Pepall and
Richards (2002).  Consumers agree that products with a stronger brand image, as measured by
the index z, are more highly valued, but consumers differ in terms of their willingness to pay for
a stronger brand.
4
In the pre-merger market there are three incumbent firms, where firm i offers a product i
with characteristic zi at price pi.  We define the parameter θ to be a consumer’s marginal
willingness to pay for the characteristic and assume that θ is uniformly distributed at unit density
over the interval  ] , [ θ θ ∈ θ  with θ > 0.  We define the indirect utility consumer θ obtains from
buying one unit of product i with characteristic content zi at price pi to be:
() { } i i i p z V V − θ + = θ , 0 max i = 1,2,3 (1)
Each consumer buys exactly one unit of the product that offers the highest utility provided, of
course, that this utility is non-negative.  We assume that V is sufficiently high that the market is
fully covered in any price equilibrium.
                                                          
3 See also Tirole (1988), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1986) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse  (1992) and
Shaked and Sutton (1982).5
We also assume the following:
(A.1) z =  1 − z ; θ =  1 − θ ,
(A.2) z z z z z z z = ∆ − = = 3 2 1 ; ;
In other words, firm 1 markets the most highly valued product, firm 3 the least valued, and firm
2 offers an intermediate brand of product.  The term ∆z is the difference in brand strength
between the top and middle brand.  Note that (A.1) implies that the extent of product
differentiation between brands 1 and 2, as measured by ∆z, is such that 0 < ∆z < 1.
5  In addition,
(1– ∆z) = z2 – z is a measure of the difference in brand strength between the middle brand and
low valued brand.
Under assumptions (A.1), (A.2) our model of consumer behavior implies that, for prices p1,
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When the incumbent firms entered the market they each incurred a sunk cost to create the
brand identity of their products.  This sunk entry cost includes the product development and
design costs.  When zi is interpreted as a measure of brand strength, these sunk costs also include
the promotional costs of marketing the brand.  For now, we assume that once established, firms
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 This brand interpretation is particularly appealing if we think of the consumers as retailers buying from
manufacturers.  Some retailers serve consumer markets where brand image plays a stronger role than for other
retailers.
5 It should be emphasized that (A.2) is not restrictive.  Suppose that in establishing this market the three firms were
initially involved in a two-stage quality-price game, with qualities being chosen sequentially in the order z1, z3, z2
and prices being chosen simultaneously after qualities are observed. Then the firms would choose z1 = z , z2 =  z  -
1/2, z3 = z  - 1.  So allowing a range on ∆z actually increases rather than decreases the generality of our analysis.6
cannot easily change their choice of zi.  The brand strength interpretation of zi is particularly
appealing in this regard.  Business consultants increasingly view brand names as strategic assets
that are key to long-term performance.  These analysts further argue that changing a well-
established brand identity can be both expensive and potentially damaging to the firm, (e.g.,
Aaker, 1996).
For each firm the marginal cost of producing the good is assumed to be constant and
independent of the characteristic zi.  This is not unreasonable if the product characteristic zi is
related to product design, image or brand strength. These are characteristics whose costs are
typically sunk and not variable costs. We do assume, however, that there are cost asymmetries
among the firms in the pre merger market.  Specifically, there are potentially two kinds of
producers, high cost producers with unit cost cH = c > 0, and low cost producers with unit cost cL
= 0. A firm might be a low cost producer because it is a multi-product firm and as such benefits
from economies of scope in the production of this good.  Alternatively, a firm might be a high
cost producer because it has a relatively small market share and therefore its best practice
technology has a higher unit cost of production.
We are interested in proposed mergers that have cost synergies, i.e., those in which one or more
high cost producers have lower costs as a result of the merger.  Section 4 of the FTC/DOJ Merger
Guidelines makes explicit reference to such mergers as the type that could potentially enhance
competition in the market.   However, it is well known that in the vertically differentiated
framework that we employ, the firm with the highest quality product tends to enjoy a distinct
advantage and a dominant market share.  We therefore focus on cost-reducing mergers between the
firms with the smallest market shares in the market because it is efficiency gains among these two
firms that are most likely to permit them to challenge the top brand firm’s dominant position.
                                                                                                                                                                                          7
We distinguish two important cases that seem most relevant to merger policy.  In the first case,
the firm that produces the intermediate brand has a cost disadvantage relative to the two other firms.
This case is, in fact, motivated by a real world example.  In the summer of 2000, the Heinz
Corporation proposed to acquire the Milnot Corporation, a firm whose major product was the well-
known Beech Nut brand of baby food.  Heinz was also a major player in the U.S. jarred baby food
industry.  Beech Nut and Heinz each had about a 15 to 17 percent share of the market.  However,
the remaining market share was virtually all controlled by the industry’s dominant firm, Gerber.
Gerber was also recognized as the industry’s premium line—the strongest brand identity and the
baby food consumers routinely identified as high quality.  By contrast, Heinz was widely known as
the discount brand or low quality product.  Beech Nut was an old, established line positioned
somewhat between Gerber and Heinz.  Partly as a result of its age, however, it was widely agreed
that while Gerber and Heinz had similar unit costs, those of Beech Nut were about 20 to 25 percent
higher.  The proposed merger was in fact largely defended by the claimed cost efficiencies that
would, it was alleged, permit production of the Beech Nut line at a unit cost similar to that incurred
by Gerber and Heinz.
Our second case is a logical extension of the first.  Here we consider a setting in which both the
intermediate and lower brand firms have higher pre-merger unit costs than the industry’s top
branded firm does.   We then assume that the merger-generated cost efficiencies allow the two
product lines to be produced at the same low cost as that incurred by the dominant firm.  The cost
synergies in the second case are therefore stronger than those assumed in the first.
3. Merger Case A: The intermediate brand firm is a high cost producer
In this case the top and low-end branded firms have low unit production costs c1 = c3 = 0,
while for the intermediate brand the unit cost is high, or c2 = c > 0.  We make two further8
assumptions to ensure that the two lower ranked brands have positive market shares in the pre-
merger market.  They are:









3.1  The Pre-Merger Equilibrium
The firms independently choose the prices of their brands to maximize profits, which from
(2a)-(2c) are defined respectively by π1 = p1D1, π2 = (p2 – c)D2, and π3 = p3D3.  It can be shown
that there exists a unique non-cooperative price equilibrium in this type of model (see, for
example, Gabszewicz et al 1981(Is this the correct reference?).  The equilibrium prices are:
( ) ( ) ( ) 6 3 1 2 , , 1 θ + ∆ − ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ z z c c z p (3a)
( ) () () 3 1 2 , , 2 z z c c z p ∆ − ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ (3b)
( ) () ( ) ( ) 6 3 3 1 2 , , 3 θ − ∆ + ∆ − + = θ ∆
∗ z z c c z p (3c)
It is straightforward to show, as we would expect, that the equilibrium product prices are




2 p  >
∗
3 p .  Note also that the
prices of all three brands are increasing in firm 2’s cost disadvantage c.  The market shares of the
three firms in the pre-merger equilibrium are given by:
( ) ( ) ( ) z z z c c z D 6 3 1 2 , , 1 θ + ∆ − ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ (4a)
( ) () () ( ) z z c z z c z D ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = θ ∆
∗ 1 3 1 , , 2 (4b)
( ) () ( ) ( ) () z z z c c z D ∆ − θ − ∆ + ∆ − + = θ ∆
∗ 1 6 3 3 1 2 , , 3 (4c)
The market shares of the top and low brand are increasing in the cost disadvantage c of the
middle brand.  As a result, when costs differ across firms the market shares of the firms do not9
necessarily conform to the consumer ranking of brands.  However, it is easy to show that
( ) ( ) θ ∆ > θ ∆
∗ , , , ,
*
2 1 c z D c z D  and ( ) ( ) θ ∆ > θ ∆
∗ , , , ,
*
3 1 c z D c z D  so that the top brand z1=z  has the
largest market share, i.e., the high quality firm is the dominant firm in this industry.  Whether or
not the market share of the intermediate brand is greater than the market share of the low brand
depends on the magnitude of the intermediate brand firm’s cost disadvantage c.   Specifically, if





∆ − ∆ < <
∆ − − θ
 then
( ) ( ) θ ∆ < θ ∆
∗ , , , ,
*
3 2 c z D c z D : firm 2’s market share is less than that of the low valued brand.
The profits of the three firms in the pre-merger market are:
() () () z z z c c z ∆ θ + ∆ − ∆ + = θ ∆ π
∗ 36 3 1 2 , ,
2
1 (5a)
() () () ( ) z z c z z c z ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = θ ∆ π
∗ 1 9 1 , ,
2
2 (5b)
() () () () () z z z c c z ∆ − θ − ∆ + ∆ − + = θ ∆ π
∗ 1 36 3 3 1 2 , ,
2
3 (5c)
Observe that the profits of the two low-cost firms, firms 1 and 3, are increasing in the cost
disadvantage c of firm 2, whereas the profit of firm 2 is, of course, decreasing in c.
3.2 The Post-Merger Equilibrium
Now suppose that the cost-disadvantaged firm 2 is able to merge with the low-cost firm 3
and that in doing so firm 3 is able to extend its low-cost production technology to firm 2. The
marginal cost of the intermediate brand 2 then becomes c2 = 0.  Because this type of merger
creates cost efficiencies between the two firms with the smaller market shares, one might think
that competition in the market will be enhanced and, therefore, that the merger will be welfare
improving for consumers.   This presumption turns out to be wrong largely because, as suggested
in the introduction, the newly merged firm has a strong profit incentive to change its product
strategy and withdraw a brand from the market.10
To see why, first suppose that in the post-merger market the merged firm continues to market
the two brands, z2 = z z ∆ −  and z3 = z, and to set the prices p2 and p3 to maximize the joint profit
of offering the two brands.  The merged firm chooses prices 
m m p p 3 2
~ , ~  to maximize:
 ) , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ~
3 2 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 1 , 3 2
m m m m m m m m m p p D p p p p D p p p p + = π
subject to the constraint that  0 ) , ( 3 2 3 ≥
m m p p D , i.e., that the low-valued brand has a non-negative
market share. This constraint is important because the merged firm has an incentive to raise the
price of the low-valued brand in order to set a higher price for the middle brand. However, if the
merged firm raises the price of the low-valued brand too high then the demand for the low-valued
good will fall to zero.  This happens when the price differential between its two brands is less than
the smallest consumer willingness to pay for the difference in the strength of the two brands.  In
other words, there is positive demand for the low brand  0 ) , ( 3 2 3 ≥
m m p p D  if and only if the price
differential ) ( ) ( 2 3 2 z z p p
m m − θ ≥ − = ) 1 )( 1 ( z ∆ − − θ . As a result, the maximum price that the merged
firm can set for the low valued brand is  ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 3 z p p
m m ∆ − − θ − = .  The rival firm, firm 1, in the
post merger market chooses a price 
m p1
~ to maximize its profit  ) , ( ) , ( ~
2 1 1 1 2 1 p p D p p p
m = π .  The
equilibrium post-merger prices for this case, subject to the constraint that good 3 has non-negative
market share, are then:
( ) 3 1 ) ( ~
1 + θ ∆ = ∆ z z p
m (6a)
() 3 ) 2 ( , ~
2 θ − ∆ = θ ∆ z z p
m (6b)
() () ( ) 3 2 3 3 , ~
3 z z z p
m ∆ − θ − ∆ − = θ ∆ (6c)11
It is clear that if the merged firm continues to market both brands of goods, 2 and 3, then the firm




~ such that the constraint on the market share of the low valued brand is
binding or that  0 ) ~ , ~ ( 3 2 3 =
m m p p D .  The profits earned by each firm in this case are:
() () 9 1 ~ 2
1 + θ ∆ = ∆ π z z
m (7a)
( ) 9 ) 2 ( , ~ 2
2 θ − ∆ = θ ∆ π z z
m                                (7b)
Because the merged firm has a profit incentive essentially to price its low-valued brand out
of the market the supposition that the firm would choose to market both brands in the post
merger outcome is questionable.  Suppose instead that the merged firm competes with the rival
firm, firm 1, by offering a single brand zm ∈ {z -∆z, z} that is either the intermediate brand or the
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p p D (8b)
The two rival firms choose prices non-cooperatively to maximize profits  ()
m D p 1 1  and
()
m D p 2 2 .  In this case, the price equilibrium is:
( ) () ( ) 3 1 , , 1 θ + − = θ m m
m z z z z p (9a)
( ) () ( ) 3 2 , , 2 θ − − = θ m m
m z z z z p (9b)
The post-merger demands to the two firms in this case are:
( ) ( ) 3 1 1 θ + = θ
m D (10a)
( ) ( ) 3 2 2 θ − = θ
m D (10b)
where (A.3) and (A.4) also guarantee that  ( ) 0 2 > θ
m D .  The post-merger profits are:12
() () () 9 1 , ,
2
1 θ + − = θ π m m
m z z z z (11a)
() () () 9 2 , ,
2
2 θ − − = θ π m m
m z z z z (11b)
The profits of both firms are decreasing in the choice of brand strength zm of the merged
firm’s product.  As a result, if the merged firm offers only one brand then it is more profitable to
market the low-valued brand z because of the softer price competition to which this maximum
differentiation gives rise. The post-merger equilibrium prices in this case are:
( ) ( ) 3 1 ~
1 θ + = θ
m p (12a)
( ) ( ) 3 2 ~
2 θ − = θ
m p (12b)
and post-merger profits to the two firms are:
() () 9 1 ~ 2
1 θ + = θ π
m (13a)
() () 9 2 ~ 2
2 θ − = θ π
m (13b)
Since 1 < ∆z , comparison of (7b) and (13b) allows us to conclude:
Proposition 1: Given (A.1) – (A.4) the merged firm will offer only the low-valued brand in
the post-merger market.
3.3 Welfare Effects of Merger
The relevant questions to ask at this point are first, whether the merger is profitable for the
merged and non-merged firms and secondly, how does the merger affect consumer welfare.
6
Proposition 2: Given (A.1) – (A.4) a merger of firms 2 and 3
(i)  increases profits of both the merged and the non-merged firms;
(ii)  benefits the non-merged firm more than the merged firm.
The merger between the high-cost firm 2 and low-cost firm 3 creates a positive externality for
the non-merged firm 1.  The externality arises because of the decision of the merged firm to
eliminate one of the brands from the market. The decision to drop the middle brand increases the13
differentiation between brands, softens price competition between the firms and so increases the
profit of the firm that is not party to the merger.  This reduction in product variety and the softer
price competition that it implies combine to reduce consumer welfare unambiguously.
Proposition 3: Given (A.1) – (A.4) a merger of firms 2 and 3 that leads to lower unit
costs of production leads to higher post-merger prices.
Proposition 3 is a powerful result.  Without any estimation of the structure of market demand
and absent any investigation of the validity of claimed cost efficiencies, Proposition 3 says that in a
vertically differentiated market that is dominated by a strong brand with a cost advantage over its
closest rival, no merger that eliminates the cost disadvantage of that second-best rival will be
beneficial to consumers. Moreover, this is not because the reduction in firms will enable any
collusion in the post-merger market. Rather it is because the surviving firms in the post merger
market act independently and choose their pricing and product strategy to maximize profits.   Even
though our theoretical framework is only an approximation to real world product competition,
Proposition 3 nonetheless serves to establish a strong prior against the ability of alleged cost
efficiencies to justify the merger.
Given the higher prices and profits accruing to both the merged firm and non-merged firm it
would be surprising if firm 1 were to object to the merger of firms 2 and 3.   However, it is worth
noting that while firm 1 will enjoy a price and profit increase as a result of the merger of firms 2
and 3, the implications for its market share are more ambiguous.  Specifically, firm 1’s market
share can rise or fall as a result of the merger depending on the size of the merger’s cost savings.
We address this issue in the proposition below.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
6    Calculations were performed using Mathematica®.  The notebook is available from the authors on request.
Proofs are presented in the Appendix.14
Proposition 4: Given (A.1) – (A.4) a merger of firms 2 and 3 decreases the market share of
the non-merged firm and increases the market share of the merged firms if and only if
( ) 2 1 θ − ∆ + ∆ > z z c .
Since θ  > 1, a sufficient condition for the merger of firms 2 and 3 to reduce the market share
of the non-merged firm 1 is that c > ∆z
2/2, which is consistent with (A.3) if ∆z < 2/3.  The merger
therefore reduces the market share of the firm 1 when the cost synergies to which the merger gives
rise are sufficiently great and when the intermediate brand, which is eliminated from the market, is
not too similar to the low brand good, i.e. the one that is offered in the post-merger market.
In sum, the merger results in consumers being offered less product selection at higher prices.
Thus, all consumers are worse off as a result of this merger despite the cost synergies that it brings.
By contrast, the merger is unambiguously beneficial for the merged and non-merged firms. Once
again, a simple intuition—independent of econometric estimation—underlies these results. The cost
synergies generated by the merger put a downward pressure on prices. But the reduction in product
selection reduces competitive pressures between the remaining firms allowing them to increase
prices.  For consumers, the loss of variety and the softening of competition outweigh the effect of
the cost synergy.  Firms gain but consumers lose from the merger.
3.4 Entry
The analysis in the previous section ignores the possibility of post-merger entry by a new
firm.  Ignoring entry is reasonable if entry into the market is blockaded because, say, the
incumbent firms control the technology, the distribution networks or the access to retailers.  In
the baby food case, it was widely agreed that for these and other reasons post-merger entry was
unlikely.  Indeed, there had been no significant entry in the industry’s previous fifty-year plus
history.  However, a merger that reduces the range of product selection, as we have shown is15
likely in the present case, does leave a gap in the market which suggests at least the potential for
entry. In turn, this threat of entry may give the merged firm an incentive to position its brand
strategically so as to deter the emergence of a new rival.  At the same time, such strategic entry
deterrence will affect both the profitability of the merger and the impact of the merger on
consumer welfare.
First, consider entry into the post-merger market when the two brands marketed by the
incumbent firms are z1 =z and zm = z, that is, the post-merger equilibrium described above.
Suppose that if the entrant invests a sunk cost fe then it can enter the market with a new brand of
good ze ∈ [] z , z .  Further suppose that the marginal cost of producing a new good is zero.
7  When
the entrant enters the post-merger market with brand ze ∈ [] z , z , we can use the demand functions
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By substituting these prices into the profit function of the new entrant and differentiating
with respect to ze we find that the optimal brand to offer satisfies the condition:
0
9









The incentive to minimize the intensity of price competition leads the entrant to position its
brand at ze = (z + z)/2, midway between the two incumbent firms’ brands, generating profit πe =
1/36 – fe.  Clearly, if the sunk cost of establishing a new brand name in this market is greater than
1/36, it follows that entry is essentially blockaded and the merger analysis of Section 3.3 holds.16
 If, however, fe < 1/36 then the merged firm can deter entry by strategically changing its post-
merger brand identity.
8  In particular, by choosing a quality closer to the product of firm 1 the merged
firm can reduce the entrant’s potential market and thereby make entry less likely.  In turn, such
strategic positioning will affect both the merger’s profitability and its impact on consumers.
3.5 Strategic Deterrence:
Suppose that the merged firm strategically selects a brand identity in the post merger market of
[] z z zm , ∈ .
9  Lemma 1 identifies the brand strength that will deter a potential entrant.
Lemma 1: An entrant firm in the post merger market will market a brand ze = (z + zm)/2 and
earn profit πe = ( z -zm)/36 – fe.  To deter entry the merged firm must therefore market a
brand zm =  z  - 36 fe.
Lemma 1 indicates that the lower is the entry cost fe, the higher is the brand strength that
the merged firm must market if entry is to be deterred.  However, the stronger is the post-
merger brand image of the merged firm, the tougher is the competition with the rival firm 1,
which adversely affects profitability of the merged firm.  Will the merged firm wish to deter
entry given that this change in branding strategy reduces its profit?













> > e f .
While Proposition 5 identifies a lower limit on the sunk entry cost fe above which the
merged firm prefers to deter rather than accommodate entry this is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for entry deterrence.  Simply put, Proposition 5 begs the larger question of whether the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Assuming c = 0 for the entrant provides a sufficient but not necessary constraint on fe for entry to be deterred.
8 Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995) also discuss vertical differentiation and entry in slightly different but related models of
product differentiation.
9 We ignore the costs of changing brand strength, as a result of which our analysis identifies necessary but not necessarily
sufficient conditions for the merger to be profitable with strategic entry deterrence.17
merger should take place at all given the threat of entry.  If the merger goes ahead and entry is
deterred the merged firm makes profit (ignoring any costs of changing its brand identity) equal to
()
2
2 4 θ π − = e
d
m f .   By contrast, if the merger does not occur then there is no entry and firms 2
and 3 continue together to make a profit equal to  ( ) ( ) θ ∆ π + θ ∆ π
∗ ∗ , , , , 3 2 c z c z  defined in 5(a)-(c).
Proposition 6: Suppose that there is a threat of post-merger entry.  Then the merger is
unprofitable if the sunk entry cost fe is less than









θ ∆ π + θ ∆ π
= θ ∆
∗ ∗ c z c z
c z f .
We provide a range of values for the critical sunk entry cost ( ) θ ∆ , ,c z f  in the Appendix.  We

















− = z z c c
c z f
.   This means that when the
incumbent firms anticipate the possibility of post-merger entry, then a merger of firms 2 and 3 is
less likely to arise under two scenarios.  The first is that the merger generates very little cost
efficiencies.  The product repositioning necessary to prevent entry intensifies price competition
with the dominant firm.  In turn, this results in losses that outweigh any benefits achieved from the
small amount of cost savings that the merger generates when c is small.
The second scenario that limits the likelihood of a merger is if it generates cost efficiencies
that are too large.  This is really a way of saying that c is quite high.  From the standpoint of firm
3, there is little incentive to remove a high-cost product if there is a real risk of its being replaced
by a low-cost competitor.
The finding that, in the presence of a potential entrant, very large cost savings act as a
disincentive for firms 2 and 3 to merge is worth noting.  Effectively, it says that in the vertically
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differentiated framework of our model, a merger defense based on very large cost efficiencies
should perhaps be greeted with some skepticism if post-merger entry is feasible.  Such large cost
efficiencies in the presence of post-merger entry could render the merger unprofitable at the start.
To put it another way, if the two firms find it profitable to merge the resultant cost efficiencies are
not likely to be very big.
Allowing for the threat of entry in the model does generate some pro-competitive features.
As noted above, it givens the merged firm an incentive to choose a brand or quality greater than z
as an entry-deterring measure.  This then strengthens price competition and thereby mitigates the
harmful effect on consumer welfare.  There is in fact a range, albeit small, of fe values such that
consumers could gain from the merger. To see this, suppose that  ( ) θ ∆ , c , z f fe > > 36 1 , in which
case entry is not blockaded but the merged firm would find it profitable to market a new brand
image to deter entry.  If fe is “close to” 1/36 the merged firm’s brand image is “close to” z and
the merger increases aggregate profit and increases prices.  By contrast, if fe is “close
to” ( ) θ ∆ , ,c z f  then the merged firm chooses a brand image closer to that of the rival firm, and
this reduces the both the profit and the price of firm 1.  We can show the following:
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Proposition 7: There exists an ε such that if  ( ) ( ) ] , c , z f , , c , z f [ fe ε θ ∆ θ ∆ + ∈  then the merger
decreases aggregate profit, decreases the price of brand 1 and increases aggregate
consumer surplus.
We summarize our results thus far as follows.  In markets in which there is a dominant
brand and two other brands, one middle-valued and the other low-valued, and in which the
middle brand has a cost disadvantage, then a merger of the two lower valued rival brands that
eliminates the cost disadvantage generally does not benefit consumers.   If post-merger entry is19
not possible, the merger will unambiguously harm consumers though it will leave firms better
off.  Even if entry is feasible, the newly merged firm may well be able to position its brand
strategically in a way that deters entry and, again, reduces consumer welfare.  Only if entry is
very likely, so that deterring it requires that the newly merged firm and its remaining rival
compete vigorously to prevent the emergence of a third rival, is it possible that the merger brings
consumers some gains.
There is one final issue to address.  In Section 3.1, we analyzed a pre-merger equilibrium,
but we did not show there that entry into the pre-merger market was not profitable.  Clearly, this
would be the case if the sunk cost of entry in the pre-merger market were sufficiently high.   The
question then is how this sunk cost of entry relates to the sunk cost fe of the potential entrant in
the post-merger market.  Suppose in the pre-merger market that only three products are
sustainable and so a new entrant into the market would drive out the lowest ranked brand.
11
Then the entrant in the pre-merger market would choose to locate its brand midway between
brands 1 and 2.  In this case there is a level of sunk entry costs () θ ∆ , c , z f ˆ  such that this type of
entry would be unprofitable.  We can show that  () θ ∆ > , , ˆ
36
1
c z f  >  ( ) θ ∆ , ,c z f  provided that ∆z >
0.33.  In other words, if the sunk cost  () θ ∆ , c , z f ˆ in the pre-merger market is sufficiently high to
insure that that pre-merger structure is indeed an equilibrium, then strategic entry-deterrence
post-merger is both feasible and profitable.
4. Merger Case B: Both the middle and low valued brands are high cost producers
We now investigate the case in which both the middle brand and the low-valued brand in the
pre-merger market are produced by high cost firms. The top-valued brand, on the other hand,
                                                                                                                                                                                          
10 Given the complicated nature of the equations, these results are based upon an extensive numerical grid search.
Details can be obtained from the authors on request.20
continues to be produced by a low cost producer.  We assume for this case that the unit
production cost of firm 1 is c1 = 0, whereas the unit costs of firm 2 and firm 3 are c2 = c3 = c > 0.
This kind of cost structure makes sense for industries in which firms with small market shares
are the high cost producers.  The rationale for a merger in this case is that it allows the small
firms to increase market share and perhaps thereby utilize a lower cost technology.
In order to ensure that the three brands have positive market share in the pre-merger market
for this case we assume that:
(A.5) ( ) 1 3 − θ − ∆ < z c
Note that since  1 > θ  (A.5) implies that the cost disadvantage c < ∆z, where ∆z is a measure of
the difference in brand strength between the top and middle-valued brands.
4.1 Pre-Merger Equilibrium
Again we identify the pre-merger equilibrium prices and profits. Initially, the firms choose
independently the prices of their brands to maximize profits, which from (2a)-(2c) are now defined
respectively by π1 = p1D1, π2 = (p2 – c)D2, and π3 = (p3 –c)D3.   The pre-merger equilibrium prices
are:
( ) ( ) ( ) 6 3 1 2 , , 1 θ + ∆ − + ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ z c z c c z p (14a)
( ) () () 3 1 2 , , 2 z c z c c z p ∆ − + ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ (14b)
( ) ( ) ( ) 6 1 ( 3 ) ) 2 3 ( 5 , , 3 − θ − ∆ − − θ + ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ z c z c c z p (14c)
As before, the top brand sells at a price 
∗ ∗ > 2 1 p p  and the middle brand sells at price greater than
the price of the low brand, or 
∗ ∗ > 3 2 p p .  The prices of all three brands are increasing in c.
The market shares of the three firms in the pre-merger equilibrium are given by:
( ) ( ) ( ) z z c z c c z D 6 3 1 2 , , 1 θ + ∆ − + ∆ + = θ ∆
∗ (15a)
                                                                                                                                                                                          
11  Gabszewicz and Thisse ( 1989) discuss this type of entry.21
( ) () z c z c z D ∆ − ∆ = θ ∆
∗ 3 , , 2 (15b)
( ) ( ) 6 3 3 , , 3 θ − ∆ + − = θ ∆
∗ z c c z D (15c)
Again (A.5) guarantees that brands 2 and 3 have positive market shares in the pre-merger
market.  In this case the market share of the top brand is increasing whereas the market shares of
the lower ranked brands are decreasing in the cost disadvantage c.  Also in this case the market
shares are unambiguously ranked by brand strength.
The pre-merger profits of the three firms are:
() () () z z c z c c z ∆ θ + ∆ − + ∆ + = θ ∆ π
∗ 36 3 1 2 , ,
2
1 (16a)
() () () z z c z c z ∆ ∆ − − ∆ = θ ∆ π
∗ 9 1 , ,
2
2 (16b)
() () () 36 3 3 1 , ,
2
3 θ − ∆ + − ∆ − = θ ∆ π
∗ z c z c z (16c)
The post-merger equilibrium for Case 2 is the same as that analyzed in Case 1, and
accordingly is defined by equations (9)-(13).  Thus Proposition 1 (In the post-merger market the
merged firm offers only the low valued brand) applies to this case as well.
4.2 Welfare Effects of Merger
Because the merger now lowers the unit cost of two firms instead of just one, the cost
efficiencies in Case 2 are much stronger than those in Case 1.  Accordingly, one might think that in
this case a merger of firms 2 and 3 would not raise market prices.  However, this supposition is not
correct.  While it is true that the welfare impact of a merger in this case is less clear-cut, it also true
that there is a non-trivial set of mergers that benefit the merged firms but hurt consumers.  Moreover,
this result again obtains even when we permit entry into the post-merger market.
To see the effects of a merger we begin by first defining three different levels of cost
disadvantage,  3 2 1 c c c ≥ ≥ , that are each a function of  z ∆ andθ . They are:22
( ) () ( ) () z z z z z c ∆ + ∆ − θ + + ∆ − ∆ = θ ∆ 2 3 2 2 ,
2
1 (17a)
() ()() ( ) () z z z z z c ∆ + θ + ∆ − θ + ∆ + ∆ = θ ∆ 2 3 1 1 2 ,
2
2 (17b)
() () () ( ) () z z z z c ∆ + ∆ − θ + + ∆ = θ ∆ 5 3 1 1 ,
2
3 (17c)
With these definitions, we now present two propositions, Propositions 8 and 9.
Proposition 8: Given (A.1), (A.2) and (A.5) a merger of firms 2 and 3 in Case 2
(i)  increases profits of the merged firms;
(ii)  decreases the profits of the non-merged firm if  ( ) θ ∆ , z c c 2 > .
If the pre-merger cost disadvantage of the merged firms is sufficiently great, i.e., if the cost
efficiencies generated by the merger are sufficiently large then the non-merged firm no longer
enjoys a positive externality.  While it still gains from the fact the merged firms reduce their
product offerings, this benefit is more than offset by the increased competitiveness of the merged
firm due to its now lower cost of production.
Proposition 9:  Given (A.1), (A.2) and (A.5) a merger of firms 2 and 3 in Case 2
(i)  leads to higher post-merger prices if  ( ) θ ∆ < , 3 z c c;
(ii)  increases the price of firm 1 but decreases the price of the low-valued brand if
( ) ( ) θ ∆ < < θ ∆ , , 1 3 z c c z c;
(iii)  decreases the price of firm 1 and the low-valued brand if  ( ) θ ∆ > , 1 z c c .
We illustrate Propositions 8 and 9 in Figure 1. In this figure, the shaded area indicates the
levels of pre-merger cost disadvantage c that do not satisfy our assumption (A.5), that is, values  for
which  ( ) 1 3 − θ − ∆ > z c . The three different levels of the pre-merger cost disadvantage of firms 1
and 2 are also indicated.  The heavy dark lines illustrate how the parameter space is partitioned for a23
given value of the parameterθ , which measures the maximum willingness to pay at the margin for
an increase in z.  The light lines show how the partition changes asθ increases.
The primary insight revealed by Figure 1 is that despite the strong cost synergies of Case B,
there is still a large region in the parameter space over which consumer welfare declines.  This is
clearly the case for values of  ( ) θ ∆ < , 3 z c c  because here, all product prices in the post-merger
market are higher.  It is also the case for much of the region in which  ( ) ( ) θ ∆ < < θ ∆ , , 1 3 z c c z c  in
which the price of the top-valued brand rises while that of low-valued brand falls.  The intuition
behind this result is equally straightforward.  The bulk of the pre-merger market is captured by the
top-valued brand.  Therefore, after the merger, consumers tend to lose more from the rise in the
price of brand 1 than they gain from the fall in the price of low valued brand.  Moreover, since the
intermediate brand is eliminated in all these cases there is reduced product selection and this also
tends to reduce consumer welfare.
(Figure 1 near here)
4.3 Entry
As in Case A, the negative impact of the merger might be reversed if there were the
possibility of entry in the post-merger market.  However, it is clear that Lemma 1 also applies to
Case B.  Hence, the essential argument that underlies the results of the previous case continues to
hold.  If the potential entrant incurs a sunk cost greater than 1/36, the threat of entry is moot.
The merger simply leads to the elimination of the intermediate brand with the net welfare
consequences depending on the value of cost disadvantage c as described above.
If  ( ) θ ∆ , , 2 c z f   < 1/36, then variants of Propositions 6 and 7 apply to Case B, as well. In other
words, for a sunk entry cost ( ) θ ∆ , , 2 c z f  below 1/36 (but not too low) the merged firm finds it24
profitable to market a brand zm strategically to deter entry.  We provide a range of values for
( ) θ ∆ , , 2 c z f  in the Appendix.  Note again that while strategic entry deterrence will intensify the post-
merger price competition it is still quite possible that consumer welfare declines despite such tactics.
Conclusions
Much of the recent work evaluating the impact of mergers in product-differentiated markets
is empirically based and relies on estimates of pre-merger demand and cost parameters to infer
the likely nature of the post-merger equilibrium.  The development of such models has been a
welcome addition to the economist’s arsenal of analytical techniques.  It may be especially
useful in assessing the ability of merger-related cost efficiencies to offset any adverse impact on
consumer welfare that the merge may have. At the same time, the insights of more purely
theoretical models can be an equally powerful tool in determining the welfare implications of
mergers with cost efficiencies.  Indeed, the insights of a formal model may be all upon which
policy makers can rely in settings in which the merging firms have an incentive to change their
product offerings so that the applicability of post-merger simulations based on pre-merger
demand estimates is questionable at best.
We have shown that changes in the product mix are particularly likely following a merger in
a vertically differentiated product market.  We have further shown that, in the absence of any
entry threat, mergers in such markets will tend to reduce product variety and raise consumer
prices virtually regardless of the level of merger related cost efficiencies.  We have also shown
that this same adverse impact on consumer welfare remains likely to characterize mergers in
vertically differentiated markets even when entry is a possibility.
The intuition behind our findings is straightforward.   In vertically differentiated markets,
the merging firms have a strong incentive to discontinue one of their two pre-merger product25
lines as a means to soften competition with the non-merging rival.  It is this post-merger product
selection decision and its implications for consumer prices that underlie our results.
From a policy perspective, our analysis makes clear that mergers that result in lower costs
may nevertheless lead to higher prices.   Indeed, the likelihood of this outcome is very high in
vertically differentiated markets.  It follows that in markets where vertical differentiation is a
primary feature, a merger defense based on alleged cost efficiencies should be viewed with
considerable skepticism.26
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) Define the impact of the merger on the firms’ profits as:
( ) ( ) ( ) θ ∆ π − θ π = θ ∆ π ∆
∗ , , ~ , , 1 1 1 c z c z
m ;  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) θ ∆ π − θ ∆ π − θ π = θ ∆ π ∆
∗ ∗ , , , , ~ , , 3 2 2 2 c z c z c z
m .  It is easy to
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( ) θ ∆ π ∆ , , 2 c z  is minimized either when c = 0 or c =∆z(1 – ∆z) (Recall A.4).
() () 0 1 3 2
9







 so  ( ) θ ∆ π ∆ , , 1 c z  is minimized at c =∆z(1 - ∆z).
Evaluation of  ( ) θ ∆ π ∆ , 0 , 2 z ;  ( ) θ ∆ − ∆ ∆ π ∆ ), 1 ( , 2 z z z  and  ( ) θ ∆ − ∆ ∆ π ∆ ), 1 ( , 1 z z z  over the
permissible ranges of ∆z and θ  confirms that they are positive.




 so  ( ) θ ∆ π ∆ , , 2 c z  -  ( ) θ ∆ π ∆ , , 1 c z  is maximized at c = ∆z(1 – ∆z).
Evaluation of  ( ) ( ) θ ∆ − ∆ ∆ π ∆ − θ ∆ − ∆ ∆ π ∆ ), 1 ( , ), 1 ( , 1 2 z z z z z z  over the permissible ranges of ∆z
and θ  confirms that it is negative.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Since pre-merger prices are increasing in c the merger is most likely to decrease prices when
c is at its upper limit. Evaluation of  ( ) ( ) θ ∆ − ∆ ∆ − θ
∗ ), 1 ( , ~
1 1 z z z p p  and
( ) ( ) θ ∆ − ∆ ∆ − θ
∗ ), 1 ( , ~
3 2 z z z p p  over the permissible range of parameters indicates that these price
differentials are positive.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Follows immediately from (4a) and (10a).29
Proof of Lemma 1:
Consider three brands with strength z1 > z2 > z3 that are marketed in the post merger market.
The resulting price equilibrium is
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The strength of brand 2 is  () 2 / 3 2 z z z + =  midway between brands 1 and 3.






θ − − = π z z e .  By contrast, if the entrant chooses brand  () 2 / 3 2 z z z + =  its profit,
ignoring entry costs, is  () 3 36
1
z z e − = π .  As a result, for any brand strength zm of the merged
firm the entrant will always choose ze = (z + zm)/2 and earn profit πe = (z -zm)/36 – f.  For the
merged firm to deter entry it must market a brand strength zm = z  - 36f.
Proof of Proposition 5:











On the other hand if the merged firm accommodates entry it markets brand zm = z while the
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m π > π .30
Appendix Table 1a:  ( ) θ ∆ , ,c z f ;  2 / 1 = ∆z
θ
0 .00781 .00817 .00874 .00962
0.05 .00615 .00609 .00617 .00645
0.10 .00531 .00493 .00463 .00443
0.15 .00531 .00470 .00412 .00357
0.20 .00615 .00540 .00463 .00386
c
0.25 .00781 .00701 .00617 .00530
Appendix Table 2:  ( ) θ ∆ , , 2 c z f ;  2 / 1 = ∆z
θ
0 .00781 .00817 .00874 .00962
0.05 .00633 .00656 .00704 .00779
0.10 .00500 .00517 .00553 .00616
0.15 .00383 .00392 .00421 .00476
0.20 .00281 .00286 .00309 .00357
c
0.25 .00195 .00196 .00215 .00260
Figure 1: Propositions 8 and 9
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